Arms proliferation and Nigeria’s security outfits

BY ZAYYAD I. MUHAMMAD

Nuhu Ribadu, the national security adviser, stated during an arms destruction exercise organised by the National Centre for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (NCCSALW) that many of the illicit weapons currently used by terrorists and bandits originally belonged to the Federal Government of Nigeria.

Ribadu’s revelation may not come as a surprise to those familiar with the complexities of Nigeria’s security challenges, but it is both new and alarming to the average Nigerian.

For many, the realisation that those entrusted with their protection are, in fact, selling weapons to terrorists, insurgents, and bandits is deeply unsettling. This issue demands a coordinated and strategic response. However, Ribadu assured that steps and measures have been taken to put an end to this.

But the big questions remain: Are these measures yielding sustainable results? What motivates or drives a security agent to sell weapons to terrorists and bandits, fully aware that they may become the first target of those very weapons?

Nuhu Ribadu said: “The worst human being is a policeman or soldier who takes weapons from his own unit and sells them, or hides them for criminals to use against his colleagues.” This is true; however, additional measures are needed beyond what the NSA has mentioned to address this issue. These should include improved welfare and salaries for security personnel, enhanced training, and stronger supervision. It’s important to consider that the actions of some security officers may not be solely motivated by money but by radicalisation or frustrations.

Nigeria must prioritise the use of technology in its fight against insurgency, terrorism, and banditry, as the world has moved beyond relying solely on boots on the ground. Employing technology to address these challenges is crucial, including the implementation of chips or inbuilt devices to track every weapon assigned to the officer responsible for it.

Despite the few rogue elements within the security forces who recklessly jeopardise their lives and those of their colleagues and families by exchanging their weapons for peanuts, we must commend the majority of Nigeria’s dedicated soldiers, police officers, and other personnel who are actively working to recover illicit arms and eliminate corrupt practices within the security forces.

On the other hand, sabotage by rogue elements within security forces is not unique to Nigeria; many countries have faced situations where insurgency, terrorism, or banditry were exacerbated by these elements selling arms to militant groups. In Yemen, amid its civil war, there have been instances of arms diversion by corrupt individuals within the security apparatus. Weapons intended for the national army have ended up in the hands of Houthi rebels and various militant groups.

Similarly, during the conflict with ISIS in Iraq, reports emerged of Iraqi security forces losing control of arms depots or selling weapons to militant groups. Somalia has seen similar issues in its battle against al-Shabaab, where government and security officials were accused of selling or diverting weapons to the very militants they were fighting.

Another notable example is Libya. Following the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, the country descended into chaos, with various factions and militias vying for control. Weapons from government stockpiles, as well as arms supplied by international actors, were sold or transferred to militias and insurgent groups, further escalating the violence. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), armed groups have long been involved in conflict, with reports indicating that elements within the military and police forces have sold weapons to these groups.

For any country grappling with the involvement of its security forces in the sale of weapons to insurgents, terrorists, and bandits, factors such as selfishness, corruption, and complicity within these forces play a significant role. Additionally, weak institutions and inadequate oversight have further exacerbated the problem.

Zayyad I. Muhammad writes from Abuja. He can be contacted via [email protected]