Beyond bullets

The global threat of terrorism has prompted nations to explore diverse solutions to mitigate its impact. In Nigeria, the military has traditionally relied on kinetic operations, focusing on physical force and supporting systems. However, in recent times, the military has adopted non-kinetic strategies, prioritizing diplomacy and other non-combatant methods that appeal to human sensibilities in its counterinsurgency operations. This approach is crucial in asymmetric and irregular warfare, where subtle and multifaceted strategies are essential.

The wisdom of this approach is echoed in the timeless principles outlined by Sun Tzu, a renowned Chinese military strategist and philosopher, in his classic work, “The Art of War.” Sun Tzu advocated for using conventional methods (kinetic) to engage in battle but emphasized the importance of unconventional methods (non-kinetic) to secure victory. This ancient wisdom remains remarkably relevant today, underscoring the value of integrating both kinetic and non-kinetic strategies to achieve success in Nigeria’s counterinsurgency operations in the North East and other parts of the country.

The deployment of unconventional methods is crucial in Nigeria’s counterinsurgency efforts, particularly against Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria. I recall a conversation with a high-ranking military officer who shared his experiences while serving as a commander in one of the military units in Borno State. Upon assuming command, he realized that success depended not only on military firepower but also on understanding local dynamics and systematically meeting the locals at the point of their needs. In his area of operation, he discovered a deeper issue: a long-standing cold war between indigenes and settlers. The indigenes, who felt entitled, did not engage in productive activities, while the settlers were economically empowered through their entrepreneurial pursuits. In an attempt to undermine the settlers’ influence, the indigenes would often provide Boko Haram with false information, labelling the settlers as military spies. Tragically, this led to the settlers being disproportionately targeted by Boko Haram attacks.

One of the first things he did was to convene several meetings with the various district heads in his Area of Responsibility (AOR). The outcome of these meetings was a unanimous desire among the locals to return to their farming livelihoods, which had been hindered by the activities of Boko Haram insurgents. Armed with this critical information, he collaborated with his lieutenants to identify and disrupt insurgent movements, conducting clearance operations to detonate landmines and create barriers. Furthermore, he negotiated a reciprocal arrangement with the district heads, promising to secure their farms in exchange for sensitive and relevant information about the insurgents. This strategic approach proved to be the turning point in the counterinsurgency efforts in his AOR.

He deployed a non-military strategy of sourcing for seedlings for the farmers, and creating a roster for designated farming days. On these days, the military provides security escorts for the farmers to and from their fields. Initially, the locals were sceptical about the success of this strategy, given their past experiences with Boko Haram. Sensing their reservations, he adapted his approach, creating a new roster that enlisted the participation of young, agile, and idle youths. Surprisingly, they readily bought into the strategy.

The example illustrated above clearly demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between kinetic and non-kinetic strategies in counterinsurgency operations. This is particularly relevant given the multi-dimensional nature of insurgency, which is inherently asymmetric. The use of brute force alone often times is not sufficient. This is why insurgencies can persist for extended periods, as evident in the protracted Boko Haram conflict. The second lesson from the above example is that by engaging the redundant youths, the recruitment drive of the Boko Haram insurgents in the area was affected, as the youths were meaningfully engaged and could not be enticed into joining their ranks. We must understand the interplay here: on one hand, a critical constituency was shielded from the lures of the Boko Haram insurgents, thereby depleting their ranks as a result of the military’s engagement in kinetic operations. On the other hand, the locals now saw the military as their saviour, rather than an occupying force in the area.

Non-kinetic operations in the military’s counterinsurgency efforts are undermined by the political class’s failure to fully recognize the strategic importance of this strategy in warfare. Winning a war often requires more than just military might. The military cannot simultaneously conduct kinetic operations and bear the sole responsibility for non-kinetic operations, which demand significant resources, long-term planning, and consistent implementation.

Traditionally, military formations receive funding for welfare and logistical requirements. However, supporting humanitarian interventions for locals within their Area of Responsibility (AOR) strains their operational effectiveness. This diversion of resources underscores the need for a more comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency, one that acknowledges the importance of non-kinetic operations and provides dedicated support and funding.

A good example of this challenge is a community ravaged by insurgency, where a primary healthcare center is urgently needed. While the military can provide temporary shelter and deploy military medical personnel, its impact is limited compared to a comprehensive government intervention. It’s essential to remember that the military is not trained for humanitarian interventions. However, the exigency of the situation and the need to win the war, not just battles, have necessitated the military’s adoption of non-kinetic strategies in its counterterrorism operations against non-state actors.

In my opinion, this remains the missing link. Often, there is no government presence in war-ravaged localities, and the political leadership leaves this burden on the shoulders of a military that is already stretched in combat with insurgents. This is a misnomer and a significant gap in the government’s approach to security issues. In asymmetric warfare, success requires a two-pronged approach: engaging in battle to win the war, not just the battle. Winning the hearts and minds of the people is as crucial as the military’s artillery sophistication. Until the political class fully acknowledges the importance of non-kinetic operations and takes up that responsibility, Boko Haram insurgents and other non-state actors will continue to exploit this vulnerability.

An example was the relative success of Abu Musab al-Barnawi’s leadership of the Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP). His approach was focused on winning the hearts and minds of the local populace by providing social services and economic opportunities to the local population. ISWAP implemented initiatives that addressed the basic needs of the community, including digging wells, distributing seeds and fertilizers, creating safe pastures for herders, and using clerics to encourage internally displaced persons to return to their communities. By assuming the role of a de facto government, ISWAP won the allegiance of the local population, making it increasingly challenging for the military to gain traction in the region. This scenario underscores the limitations of military force alone in counterinsurgency efforts, highlighting the need for a multi-pronged approach that prioritizes winning the hearts and minds of the local population.

Despite the military’s notable progress in humanitarian interventions, infrastructure development, and community engagement, the full potential of these initiatives remains untapped due to the government’s limited recognition of non-kinetic strategies as a vital component of counterinsurgency operations. This oversight is particularly striking in the context of the Boko Haram insurgency, which has devastated the country since 2009.

To effectively counter insurgency, the government must take a more proactive role in supporting the military’s efforts. This involves implementing initiatives that build trust with local communities, promote economic empowerment, support education and vocational training, and facilitate reconciliation and reintegration of former combatants. A solely kinetic approach has limitations, and a more comprehensive strategy is needed to win the war, not just battles. I believe this paradigm shift is crucial in vanquishing extremist groups like Boko Haram in North East Nigeria and other parts of the country challenged by the activities of non-state actors, and can ultimately lead to lasting peace and stability in Nigeria.

Ocheja, PhD, specializes in the intricate military histories of Nigeria and Africa.