Your Say

CCT and the matter involving Saraki

March 29, 2016 9:49 pm

By Carol Ajie

On 11 September, 2015 a deputy director in the Federal Ministry of Justice filed an application in the CCT, Abuja, asking for the commencement of trial of Dr Bukola Saraki, President of the Senate, Federal Republic of Nigeria, on a charge of false declaration of assets, with 13 counts – Charge No. CCT/ABJ/01/2015 dated 14 September, 2015.

The application was granted by the Tribunal, sitting with its Chairman, Mr Danladi Umar and one other member, Mr Agwadza Atedze, which directed that a summons should be issued commanding the accused to appear before it and plead to the charge. On 17 September, Dr Saraki, through his counsel, filed an application praying the Tribunal to quash and/or strike out the charge against him. After due hearing, the application was dismissed on 18 September, 2015. By its ruling dismissing the application, the Tribunal also issued a bench warrant ordering the Inspector-General of Police to arrest and produce the accused in the Tribunal on 21 September, 2015.

The accused then applied to, and obtained from the Federal High Court, (FHC) Abuja, an order dated 17 September, 2015 directing the Tribunal to appear before it on 21 September 2015 to show cause why the proceedings before it (i.e. the Tribunal) should not be halted. The Tribunal refused to comply with the order of the FHC, and went ahead with the trial, which was eventually halted by the Supreme Court.
Eight issues arise from the above stated facts:
ISSUE ONE
WHETHER THE CODE OF CONDUCT TRIBUNAL (CCT) IS NOT, IN ITS TRUE CHARACTER, AS IT IS CONCEIVED AND ESTABLISHED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA 1999, A PURELY DISCIPLINARY BODY
1.1 The CCT is a body established by the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution 1999 to deal with contraventions or breaches of the duties laid on public officers by the Code of Conduct enshrined in the said Fifth Schedule. The issue raised here is as to what the true character of the Tribunal is – whether it is simply a body to exercise disciplinary control of public officers or a court with criminal jurisdiction. The answer depends on the nature of the duties laid on public officers by the Code of Conduct. Are the duties criminal in nature and effect or purely disciplinary? Or putting it differently, is the Code in the nature of a Criminal Code or a Disciplinary Code designed to regulate the way public officers discharge their official duties and responsibilities towards the public, much like the Civil Service Rules?
1.2 This requires that the provisions of the Code of Conduct should be looked at very closely. A close look shows that although some of the provisions are in their terms prohibitory, the Code is merely a body of rules designed to regulate the civil, not criminal, behaviour of public officers. The duties it imposes on public officers are not in the nature of criminal obligations or liabilities. In any case, it is outside the purpose, concern or role of a constitution anywhere in the world to create criminal offences.
1.3 Furthermore, the sanctions or penalties prescribed by the Code for contraventions or breaches of its provisions show that its purpose and intent is disciplinary, not punitive. Under paragraph 18 of the said Fifth Schedule, the CCT is empowered to impose as sanctions the vacation of an office or a seat in a legislative house, disqualification from holding office or such seat, and the seizure or forfeiture to the state of any property acquired in abuse or corruption of office. These are purely disciplinary sanctions or penalties, not punishment for a criminal offence.
1.4 This conclusion is supported by the authority of the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in a Ceylonese appeal in Kariapper v. Wijesinha [1967] 3 ALL E.R. 485. In 1965 some members of the legislative assembly and the local government councils in Ceylon were found guilty of corruption by a commission of enquiry. The country’s legislature then enacted a law vacating their seats in parliament and in the local government councils and also disqualifying them for seven years from being voters or candidates in any parliamentary or local government elections. The Privy Council held, relying on a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Lovett (1945) 328 U.S. 303, that the penalties imposed by the law were not punishment for the criminal offence of corruption, but only disciplinary sanctions “to keep public life clean for the public good” at page 491.
1.5 In the view of the Privy Council, there is a difference between a disciplinary penalty and a punishment for an offence, quoting the words of Justice Frankfurter in the United States case, United States v. Lovett (1945) 328 U.S. 303, –
“Punishment presupposes an offence, not necessarily an act previously declared criminal, but an act for which retribution is exacted. The fact that harm is inflicted by government authority does not make it punishment. Figuratively speaking all discomforting action may be deemed punishment because it deprives of what otherwise would be enjoyed. But there may be reasons other than punitive for such deprivation. A man may be forbidden to practice medicine because he has been convicted of a felony…. Or because he is no longer qualified…….The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment, the circumstances attending and the causes of the deprivation determining this fact.”
The meaning of the word “punishment” in paras 18(1) & (2) as denoting simply “sanction” is brought out clearly by para 18(3) which refers to “the sanctions mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) hereof”. It would distort the entire scheme contemplated by the establishment of the CCT to read “punishment” in the context of para 18 as meaning punishment for a criminal offence rather than as a disciplinary sanction.
1.6 The decision of the Privy Council in this case shows clearly that the Code of Conduct Tribunal is conceived and established by the Constitution as a disciplinary body, and that the power given to it by paragraph 18 of the Fifth Schedule are intended, not really to punish, but to discipline and, in the words of the Privy Council, to “keep public life clean for the public good”.
1.7 The view of the provisions in paragraph 18(1) (2) & (3) as disciplinary sanctions rather than punitive derives support from the provision in paragraph 18(6), which says:
“Nothing in this paragraph shall prejudice the prosecution of a public officer punished under this paragraph or preclude such officer from being prosecuted or punished for an offence in a court of law”.
The provision in paragraph 18(6) seems conclusive that paragraph 18(1), (2) and (3) creates no criminal offences, and that the sanctions therein mentioned are not punishment for a criminal offence, as otherwise it will contradict or conflict with the prohibition against double jeopardy in section 36(9) of the Constitution, which says:
“No person who shows that he has been tried by any court of competent jurisdiction or tribunal for a criminal offence and either convicted or acquitted shall again be tried for that offence or for a criminal offence having the same ingredients as that offence save upon the order of a superior court”.
1.8 The view of the matter here canvassed is also supported, and is certainly not contradicted, by paragraph 18(3), which says that “the sanctions mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) hereof shall be without prejudice to the penalties that may be imposed by any law where the conduct is also a criminal offence.” This again suggests that the conduct proscribed by the Code is not thereby made a criminal offence. Paragraph 18(3) also clearly contemplates trial and punishment by a court, not the Code of Conduct Tribunal, “where the conduct is also a criminal offence.” A distinction in here drawn between sanctions for contraventions or breaches of the Code of Conduct, which are merely disciplinary, and punishment for criminal offences.
1.9 Finally, the character of the CCT as a purely disciplinary body under the Constitution is reflected in the procedure provided in paragraph 3(e) of the Third Schedule to the Constitution for invoking its powers; they can only be invoked by the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) referring to it a complaint about non-compliance with, or breach of, the provisions of the Code of Conduct. The CCB is also a disciplinary body authorised, not only to receive complaints, and investigate them, but also to “ensure compliance with and, where appropriate, enforce the provisions of the Code of Conduct” : paragraph 3(d), Third Schedule; (emphasis supplied).
1.10 Accepting the arguments and conclusions above about the character of the CCT as a purely disciplinary body, the Federal High Court, per Justice Jonah Adah, in the Dariye Case held that :
“the Code of Conduct Tribunal is conceived by the Constitution as a disciplinary body, and that the power given to it by paragraph 18 of the Fifth Schedule are intended, not really to punish, but to discipline and, in the words of the Privy Council, to ‘keep public life clean for the public good’. I am entirely in agreement with this position of Professor Nwabueze (SAN) as the exact intendment of the Constitution relating to the Code of Conduct Tribunal. This is manifestly clear from the provision of paragraph 18(6)” – at page 15 of his judgment : Fed Republic of Nigeria v. Chief Joshua Chibi Dariye.
1.11 The CCT itself has affirmed that, under the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, it is a purely disciplinary body, with no power to try criminal offences – see Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Dr Orji Uzor Kalu (judgment delivered on 26 April, 2006 – a case in which Dr Orji Kanu, former Governor of Abia State, was arraigned before the CCT on a charge of corruption, and in which the former Governor pleaded in defence, his immunity under section 308(1) of the Constitution. The CCT, speaking through its then Chairman, Justice Constance Momoh, held the immunity inapplicable as a defence to the suit, on the ground that the Tribunal (i.e. the CCT) is not a court, but a purely disciplinary body, that it has no power to try criminal offences, and that proceedings before it are sui generis and are not civil or criminal proceedings to which alone section 308(1) applies, see Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Dr Orji Uzor Kalu, Charge No. CCT/NC/ABJ/KW/03/3/05/MI.
1.12 It follows from all what is said above, in particular the decisions noted in paragraphs 1.4, 1.10 and 1.11, that it is unconstitutional, null and void for the Code of Conduct Bureau & Tribunal Act to change the character of the CCT from that of a purely disciplinary body to a court, with power, albeit limited power, to try criminal cases and, on conviction, sentence persons for criminal offences. The point is fully argued under Issue Two below wherein the discussion on the true character of the CCT is continued.

ISSUE TWO
WHETHER THE WORD “TRIBUNAL” IN THE NAME CODE OF CONDUCT TRIBUNAL (CCT) SIGNIFIES A COURT IN THE DISTINCTIVE SENSE IN WHICH THE TERM IS USED IN THE CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA 1999, I.E. AS A TERM WITH ATTRIBUTES AND INCIDENTS THAT DISTINGUISH IT FROM A TRIBUNAL IN THE GENERAL SENSE
2.1 Before the intrusion of military rule into our governmental system, and the creation by Decrees of the Federal Military Government (FMG) of a plethora of tribunals or special tribunals invested with jurisdiction to try and punish a miscellany of criminal offences, tribunals, though not unknown, were generally regarded as a special specie different from, and not forming part of, our ordinary court system. With the creation of so many of them by the FMG, to meet the need, as their creation was rationalized, of expedition and the avoidance of undue technicality in the trial of economic or anti-social crimes (see my book Military Rule and Constitutionalism in Nigeria (1992) pp. 59 – 97) they remained still and functioned outside the ordinary court system.
2.2 But we are now told that there is no difference between the two. Justice Ademein, Justice Court of Appeal (JCA), delivering the majority judgment of himself and Justice Mustapha JCA, Justice Ekanem JCA dissenting, tells us, after a rather academic and unhelpful recitation, covering three pages, of the definition of the two terms in four dictionaries, that “there is no significant difference between a ‘court’ and a ‘tribunal’, and that the difference between [them] is a matter of mere nomenclature and or semantic.” The CCT, he held, citing in support an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal, is “a special court” : see Attorney-General of the Fedn & 2 Ors. v. Alhaji Atiku Abubakar (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt 1035) 117
2.3 But surely the issue before the Court is not whether there is a difference between a court and a tribunal in the general sense in which the two are used and understood, nor even in the sense in which they are understood in our legal system in general, but rather whether there is a difference between them in the sense in which they are used in the Constitution of Nigeria 1999.
2.4 Our Constitution is replete with numerous references to a “court” or a “court of law” and a few references to a ‘tribunal’. A look at the context in which the word “court” is used in the Constitution leaves it in no doubt that the Constitution attaches to it a meaning different from a tribunal in the general sense. But such inquiry will be laborious. Happily, we do not have to go through the entire Constitution for this purpose; we only need to look at section 6, which is unequivocal that a court in the sense of the Constitution is not just any tribunal, but one in which judicial power is vested.

2.5 Section 6(5) then goes on to list by name nine courts embraced in the vesting of judicial power, namely –
“(a) the Supreme Court of Nigeria;
(b) the Court of Appeal;
(c) the Federal High Court;
(d) the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja
(e) the High Court of a State;
(f) the Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja
(g) a Sharia Court of Appeal of a State;
(h) the Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja
(i) a Customary Court of Appeal of a State”.
2.6 The section further states in its sub-section (3) that the nine named courts “shall be the only superior courts of record in Nigeria, and save as otherwise prescribed by the National Assembly or by the House of Assembly of a State, each court shall have all the powers of a superior court of record.”
2.7 The CCT is not listed by name in section `6(5). The question, however, is whether it is embraced in the residual clause in section 6(5) (j) “such other courts as may be authorized by law to exercise jurisdiction on matters with respect to which the National Assembly may make laws”. (emphasis supplied)
2.8 In interpreting the residual clause (section 6(5)(j), attention needs to be drawn to the provision with which section 6 begins (i.e. section 6(1)). It says “the judicial powers of the Federation shall be vested in the courts to which this section relates, being courts established for the Federation”. The word “court” is in bold to emphasise that the provision, equally as the provision in the residual clause (s.6(5)(j)), has in contemplation a “court” strictly so-called; it did not say a court or tribunal, as in some other provisions, e.g. section 36(1), (4) & (9). Secondly, the CCT was established by the Constitution, and if it was intended to be included in the listing in section 6(5), it would have been mentioned by name like the nine courts so named, and not left to be inferred from the residual clause (i.e. section 6(5)(i).
2.9 The distinctive meaning of the word, “court” under our Constitution is well captured by Ekanem JCA in his dissenting judgment when he held as follows:
“It [i.e. the CCT] is in my view not a superior court of record as envisaged by Section 6(3) and (5) (a) – (i) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). It is not included in subsection 5(a) – (i) as one of the superior courts of record in Nigeria”, citing in support National Union of Electricity Employees v. Bureau for Public Enterprises (2010) 7 NWLR (1194) 536.
2.10 It follows from what is said above that the CCT is not a court in the sense of section 6 of our Constitution, and is not one of the courts in which judicial power is vested by the said section 6.
Meaning and incidents of judicial power
2.11 Judicial power has been defined in many decisions of the highest courts – the U.S. Supreme Court, the Privy Council and the High Court of Australia. These decisions are discussed in my book Judicialism (1977), and it is not intended to go into another discussion of them here.
2.12 But it is necessary to state that the vesting of judicial power in the judicature under section 6 has the same effect in law as the vesting of executive power in the President under section 5 and the vesting of legislative power in the National Assembly under section 4. It is as unconstitutional, null and void for the National Assembly to attempt, by means of a law made by it, to exercise, take away, transfer to other persons or otherwise usurp the judicial power vested in the judicature, or any part of it, as it is for it to attempt to do the same thing with respect to the executive power vested in the President. The decisions on the point, of which there are legion, are again discussed in my Judicialism (1977).
2.13 What is said above is by way of introduction. The issue which is of direct bearing to the matter at hand concerns the incidents of judicial powers. It is necessary to note at the outset that judicial power is the source of the jurisdiction exercised by individual courts or judges or, putting it differently, the jurisdiction of individual courts or judges is the product of, or is derived from, the judicial power vested in the judicature by section 6 of the Constitution.
2.14 The vesting of judicial power in the judicature does not, however, operate as a grant of jurisdiction to the nine courts named in section 6(5) or any of them to hear and determine any particular justiciable dispute or matter. No court can assume jurisdiction to exercise any part of the judicial power of the Federation except such jurisdiction has been conferred on it by the Constutiton or by a law validly made by the National Assembly: see Ex parte McCardle 7 Wall 506, 514 (1868), per Chief Justice Chase. There is thus raised here a distinction between the “judicial power” of the state and the jurisdiction of individual judges or courts. The former refers to the general power of an organised political community to settle disputes among its members, or between itself and its members, and to try and punish those offending against it. The distribution or allocation of that power among individual courts or judges is a function of law-making primarily through the supreme law of the Constitution, supplemented by the ordinary law. It is the specific allocations of the general judicial power that bestow jurisdiction on individual courts. Jurisdiction relates therefore to the power of a particular court to hear and determine certain cases or classes of cases; as such it has to be specifically conferred by law quite apart from the general vesting of the judicial power in the judicature. The relation between judicial power and jurisdiction is thus that between the general and the particular; the former may be regarded as the unallocated whole embracing the separate jurisdictions and powers which under the constitution and various enabling laws the courts exercise in the administration of justice. For the distribution or allocation of judicial power among the nine courts named in section 6(5), see sections 230 – 296 in chapter vii of the Constitution headed THE JUDICATURE.
2.15 More importantly, any functions appertaining exclusively to judicial power cannot be granted to a court or tribunal which is not included in section 6(5) of the Constitution as the courts constituting the judicature and in whom judicial power is vested. As to attributes necessary to judicial power and those exclusive to it, see Nwabueze, Judicialism (1977), pages 2 – 14. One such attribute or function exclusive to judicial power is the trial and, on conviction, the imposition of punishment on persons for criminal offence.
2.16 The High Court of Australia (the highest court in the country) has held in Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia v. J.W. Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 C.L.R. 434 at page 444, per Chief Justice Griffith for the Court:
“It is not disputed that convictions for offences and the imposition of penalties and punishments are matters appertaining exclusively to judicial powers.”
The word “exclusively” is underlined for purposes of emphasis. The learned Chief Justice has observed earlier in the judgment at page 442:
“It is impossible under the constitution to confer such functions upon any body other than a court, nor can the difficulty be avoided by designating a body, which is not in its essential character a court, by that name, or by calling the function by another name. In short, any attempt to vest any part of the judicial power…….in any body other than a court is entirely ineffective”.
2.17 As under the Constitution of Nigeria 1999, judicial power is vested in courts specified in section 6(5), it follows that the courts so listed are the only tribunals that can try and convict a person for a criminal offence under the principle laid down by the High Court of Australia in Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia v. J.W. Alexander Ltd, supra. The CCT, not being so listed, cannot be authorized by an ordinary law, such as the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act to try, convict and impose punishment on persons for criminal offences.
2.18 The other provisions of the 1999 Constitution relevant to the matter are section 35(1)(a) and 36(4). The Constitutions of 1960 and 1963 had provided that “whenever any person is charged with a criminal offence, he shall, unless the charge is withdrawn, be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court.” (emphasis supplied) The provision was repeated in exactly the same terms in the draft of the 1979 Constitution prepared by the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) and adopted by the Constituent Assembly. In the final version of the Constitution as enacted into law by a Decree of Gen. Obasanjo’s Federal Military Government, the guarantee was modified to read “by a court or tribunal.” (section 36(4)). The words “or tribunal” were added in order apparently to embrace within the constitutional provision the several special tribunals created by the military government and invested with jurisdiction over a variety of criminal offences. The addition of the words “or tribunal” means that the Constitution does not regard a court and a tribunal as one and the same thing, and that it differentiates between them.
2.19 However, in modifying the guarantee to read by “a court or tribunal,” the draftsman forgot to take congnisance of the implication of an earlier provision of the Constitution (section 35(1)(a)) according to which only “the sentence or order of a court in respect of a criminal offence of which [a person] has been found guilty,” (without the addition of the words “or tribunal”), is a ground for deprivation of personal liberty by detention or imprisonment for a criminal offence committed by him. As this earlier provision (section 35(1)(a)) is the one spelling out the constitutionally permitted grounds for the deprivation of personal liberty by detention or imprisonment the addition of the words “or tribunal” in section 36(4) is of no legal effect whatever, as conviction and sentence by such a tribunal, including the CCT, is not a constitutionally permitted ground for detention or imprisonment. This conclusion is reinforced by the vesting of judicial power in the courts, with the consequence of precluding trial, conviction and punishment for criminal offences by a tribunal which is not court as specified in section 6(5). In any case, the provisions in section 35(1)(a) and section 36(4) grant no jurisdiction to any court or tribunal; they only guarantee to a person the right to be tried by a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction. Jurisdiction for the enforcement of the rights guaranteed in sections 33 – 45 is conferred on the High Court by section 46.
2.20 It is true that paragraph 15(4) of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution empowers the National Assembly “by law to confer on the Code of Conduct Tribunal such additional powers as may appear to it to be necessary to enable it more effectively to discharge the functions conferred on it in this Schedule”. (emphasis supplied) The concern of the provision is with how the functions, but only the functions, “conferred on [the CCT]in this Schedule” can more effectively be discharged. The functions in question are those set out in para 18(1) & (2) of the Fifth Schedule, and no others; and they include “such other punishment as may be prescribed by the National Assembly” in para 18(1). It means, first, that the National Assembly cannot, by virtue of this provision, confer on the Tribunal additional powers that are inconsistent with any provisions in the body of the Constitution, including section 6, since, in the event of inconsistency between a provision in a Schedule and one in the body of the Constitution, the latter prevails, as laid down in decided authorities : see Re Baines (1840) 12 A & E 227, per Lord Cottenham L.C.; Dean v. Green (1882) 8 P.D. 79, per Lord Penzance.
2.21 Second, the National Assembly cannot, in exercise of power under paragraph 15(4), competently confer on the Tribunal additional powers not related or limited to functions conferred by the Fifth Schedule, especially where such additional functions or powers will change the character of the CCT from that of a disciplinary body, as it is conceived by the main operative provisions in paragraph 18 of the 5th Schedule, to a court with criminal jurisdiction. The additional powers that may be conferred on the Tribunal under paragraph 15(4) are only meant “to enable it more effectively to discharge its functions” as a disciplinary body under paragraph 18 i.e. “functions conferred on it in this Schedule”, not functions conferred on it by any other law.
2.22 The principle of the decision in Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia v. J.W. Alexander Ltd, supra, as enshrined in sections 6, 35(1)(a) and 36(4) of the Constitution of Nigeria, has been affirmed and re-affirmed by our Supreme Court. Thus, in Sofekun v. Akinyemi (1981) 1 NCLR 135 where a public officer in the public service of the then Western Region of Nigeria was dismissed upon a finding of guilt for indecent assault and attempted rape by a disciplinary tribunal constituted and empowered in that behalf under the Public Service Commission Regulations, his dismissal was held null and void by the Supreme Court as a usurpation of judicial power.
2.23 In a judgment concurred in by Irikefe, Bello, Idigbe, Obaseki, Eso and Aniagolu JJSC, Fatayi-Williams CJN said at page 146:
“It seems to me that once a person is accused of a criminal offence, he must be tried in a court of law where the complaints of his accusers can be ventilated in public and where he would be sure of getting a fair hearing…..No other Tribunal, Investigating Panel or Committee will do…If Regulations such as those under attack in this appeal were valid, the judicial power could be wholly absorbed by the Commission (one of the organs of the Executive branch of the State Government) and taken out of the hand of the magistrates and judges….If the Commission is allowed to get away with it, judicial power will certainly be eroded……The jurisdiction and authority of the courts of this country cannot be usurped by either the Executive or the Legislative branch of the Federal or State Government under any guise or pretext whatsoever”. (emphasis supplied)
2.24 The decision was re-affirmed by the Court in Garba v. University of Maiduguri [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt 18) 550 where some students involved in acts of rioting and arson were expelled from the University. The Supreme Court, reversing the Court of Appeal and affirming the trial court, declared the expulsion null and void: first, since the expulsion was based on criminal offences alleged to have been committed by the students, only the court, but not the Visitor, Vice-Chancellor or the investigating panel set up by the University, is, by virtue of sections 6 and 33(1), (4) and (13) of the 1979 Constitution, competent to adjudicate upon the guilt or innocence of the students for the alleged criminal offences; second, whilst the University authorities may expel a student for misconduct not amounting to a criminal offence, yet as a disciplinary body, they are bound to act judicially, comply with the constitutional requirement of fair hearing and observe the other requirement of the rule of natural justice; in this case, the students were not given a fair hearing, and as the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, being a victim of the students’ rampage (his house was burnt down), his chairmanship of the investigating panel created a real likelihood of bias in that he was thereby put in a position of being both a witness and a judge all at the same time.
2.25 Applying these decisions, the Federal High Court (FHC), per Justice Jonah Adah, held in the Dariye case that –
“the Code of Conduct Tribunal is never conceived of as a Court by the Constitution and no legislation of the National Assembly can empower it to act as a Court or dress it with judicial powers which are only meant to be exercised by the Courts created by Section 6 of the Constitution. This conclusion has solved most of the nagging questions yet to be answered in this case. Since the Code of Conduct Tribunal is not a Court and has no power of criminal trial, it cannot issue any warrant for the arrest or imprisonment of any person under any guise. Infact the power given to the Tribunal under paragraph 18 of the 5th Schedule to the Constitution does not extend to ordering the arrest or detention of any person who contravenes the Code of Conduct. Any law which confers that power on the Tribunal will definitely be inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution and therefore null and void.”