Good riddance to AES: ECOWAS’ chance to reinvent or perish starts now

Today marks the expiration of the six-month grace period the Economic Community of West African States gave to Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, who unilaterally left the organisation to create a rival Alliance of Sahelian States in September 2024. As with other international organisations, states are sovereign, and membership in these bodies is as voluntary as their withdrawal. As such, what is left of the erstwhile 15-member bloc and its leadership under Nigeria’s president, Bola Tinubu, should simply let the departing members be without bending over backwards to get them to remain. The advocated fait accompli should be seen as a product of the organisation’s failure to forge an identity of its own instead of its fate being led by the nose by circumstances.

ECOWAS was founded in 1975 by the Treaty of Lagos, following its founders’ push to “promote co-operation and integration … to raise the living standards of its peoples and to maintain and enhance economic stability.”

However, the success of that mission has remained starkly debatable. The region may have achieved 90 days of visa-free travel among its people and collaboration on specific issues, but nearly 50 years later, the rancorous withdrawal of three members of the 15-member body shows that it has failed to live up to its stated goals. Regional economic integration has not been achieved in a way that improves trade and develops the economies in the community. Nigeria’s questionable decision to close its borders to trade and free movement in 2019, coming off the heels of continental gusto for the Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement, in many respects, spotlighted in no small measure some of the impediments of economic development in the region, and such action coming mere months after talks about a regional currency (Eco) was put on ice pointed to the fact that much of what ails the subregion is a product of its own doing.

However, the fact that the three-member states pulled out in the manner they did and in the circumstances they did questions the mission and vision of such regional consensus. Between 2020 and 2023, at least three countries in the region experienced hostile military takeovers that ended the democratic experiments in the respective countries. What the three departing countries also have in common is acute security challenges from Islamist groups that ensure that large swathes of their territories are under the control of armed groups, fuelling an ungoverned spaces phenomenon that even more armed groups are looking to exploit in a geographic space where borders are as contiguous as they are porous and are threatening to engulf coastal states. ECOWAS’s fecklessness in the face of these extra-constitutional actions has meant that its response has become blighted by ineffectiveness, thus letting member states ride roughshod over what ordinarily should be the collective member resolve of ridding the subregion of such antidemocratic actions.

It does not take ingenuity for anyone to recognise that the organisation in its present state—as it runs many gauntlets—is patently unsatisfactory. It is lagging behind in economic comparison with its regional rivals, the East African Community and the Southern Africa Development Commission. The EAC’s consistent growth paints a compelling picture. While ECOWAS’s economic trajectory heavily relies on Nigeria’s volatile oil sector—constituting around 65% of government revenue, according to EITI, making it vulnerable to global price fluctuations—the EAC has cultivated more diversified economies. This is reflected in consistent GDP growth rates, often surpassing ECOWAS averages, as World Bank data shows. For instance, in 2022, the EAC experienced an average GDP growth of 5.1%, compared to 3.6% for ECOWAS. This diversification within the EAC provides greater resilience against external shocks, a crucial advantage ECOWAS lacks.

Furthermore, while SADC boasts a higher average HDI, largely thanks to South Africa, it’s important to acknowledge that this masks significant internal inequalities. However, even accounting for these disparities, SADC’s focus on targeted development initiatives has yielded tangible improvements in key human development indicators compared to ECOWAS. For example, SADC’s average HDI value in 2021 was 0.570, compared to 0.513 for ECOWAS (according to UNDP data). ECOWAS presents a far more uneven landscape, with stark contrasts between member states, hindering overall regional progress. This is further compounded by persistent political instability and conflicts within the ECOWAS region, which divert resources and impede economic development.

Finally, regarding regional integration, the EAC’s commitment to a common market and progress towards monetary union sets it apart. While ECOWAS has focused on trade liberalisation and free movement, implementation has been inconsistent and hampered by diverse economic structures and political will. For instance, intra-EAC trade as a percentage of total trade is significantly higher than intra-ECOWAS trade, indicating deeper integration. While primarily focused on trade integration, SADC has established more effective mechanisms for dispute resolution and cooperation on infrastructure projects than ECOWAS. This lack of cohesive regional integration within ECOWAS limits its ability to capitalise on economies of scale and foster sustainable growth. Thus, while ECOWAS possesses significant potential, its overreliance on a single volatile commodity, uneven human development progress, and weaker integration mechanisms have placed it behind the EAC and SADC in achieving tangible regional progress.

As such, the leadership of ECOWAS simply does not have the bargaining chip to get its departing members to stay. In one area where it could wield its geographic advantage on the account that the AES states are landlocked, it put national interests ahead of group interests. Niger’s geography, for instance, deprives it of sea access. It depends on Benin and Nigeria for its sea trade. The Niger-Benin export pipeline—a 1,950-kilometre-long crude oil pipeline connecting oilfields near the desert oasis of Agadem in Niger to the Atlantic Ocean—makes use of Benin’s ports. One of the reasons for the ECOWAS sanctions on Niger following its coup in July 2023 that ended President Mohammed Bazoum’s reign was because of pressure on the community from Porto-Novo over the losses it could accrue from the closure of its ports as a transit hub in crude shipment to China, which funded the project.

In an ideal scenario, the AES states should have changed their behaviour and directions by the mere threat of sanctions from ECOWAS. However, the latter’s credibility challenges have become an albatross around its neck. It could not impose its will because, among other things, it has failed in its foundational promise of regional economic integration. Boasting a collective GDP exceeding $628 billion and a population of over 350 million, the bloc was poised to become a leading economic powerhouse in Africa. However, this potential has yet to be fully realised. Intra-regional trade within ECOWAS remains strikingly underdeveloped, representing a meagre 10% of the bloc’s total trade activity and a negligible 0.3% share of global commerce. This limited internal exchange impedes deeper economic integration. It diminishes ECOWAS’s influence within the global economy and domestically and the efficacy of wielding the whip when the need arises.

The exit of the three Sahelian states thus provides a unique and rare opportunity for ECOWAS to develop without the baggage of its non-democratic members holding it down. To begin with, it must first find its identity. Does it want to be a strictly economic grouping or a political union? Its lack of identity is why it has become less viable than hoped. It cannot continue to be a pretend political union without achieving the basics of economic integration. This can begin with the commitment to making the proposed Lagos-Abidjan superhighway start and complete within its stipulated timeframe (2026-2030).

Furthermore, it has to be understood that insisting on the regional Eco currency when the right economic conditions have not been met is a primer for hoisting their petard. Such lofty dreams have taken precedence over a pressing, low-hanging fruit like fair business practices for member-state nationals, including the ease and freedom of doing business and crossing borders without harassment by state officials. Obsessing over the exit of three landlocked states whose combined GDP of a maximum of $ 35 billion compared to the remaining bloc members’ of $ 600 billion is a very unproductive use of one’s time. It is a pointer to the lack of productivity that pervades the region, so much so that it colours official decision-making and regional policy. This has to change. In addition to these changes, the remaining bloc members must make it a duty to increase regional cooperation against the insecurity that pervades the region. Suppose the excuse of bad relations can be made for broken border cooperation to improve security between Abuja and Niamey. Can the same argument be made for the sorry state of security on the northern border between Nigeria and Benin? Or a lack of joint border patrol between Ivory Coast and Ghana? These failings and attitudes to regional development must give way to better actions that lead to improved outcomes.

The central idea is that leaders and members of the bloc must go out of their way to make the organisation an envy of non-members. The Association of South East Asian Nations–with only ten member states–has a combined GDP of $3.67 trillion. Membership grants state access to free trade areas and a very big market. It does not come cheap. The body does not admit just anyone, requiring prospective members to meet certain criteria such as visible degrees of internal stability and ability to meet bloc commitments. This is why the application of Bangladesh, East Timor and Papua New Guinea has stalled, among other issues such as geography. Under ASEAN’s stringent membership criteria, poor and unstable states like Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger would not be admitted. ECOWAS’ mistake is foundational–admitting just anyone because of geographic contiguity. This ‘brotherhood’ sentiment has not led to better outcomes for collective group growth. It has to be abandoned, and a timeline for turning the bloc into the political union its current political elites wish has to be drawn with economic action points that must be ruthlessly adhered to.

The umbilical cords of the countries in West Africa are not tied together. Shared geography does not necessarily mean the same destiny. I write as someone who has long dreaded the break-up of the community. However, if its split will bring together better collaboration and effective regional development in clusters, by all means, let it happen without the yoke that its recalcitrant members bring. The bloc has spent too much time crying over spilt milk. The region’s future hangs in the balance amid rampant poverty, insecurity, and instability. There is no more time to waste. The door must be firmly slammed in the faces of the departing members, and attention must now be turned to fixing the teeming issues that face the region.

McHarry is a senior analyst at SBM Intelligence